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It is significant that most sources of childhood and 
later fears identified by various investigators can be 
broadly categorized in terms of a general tendency 
to fear the very strange, especially when it is 
closely associated with the familiar, and that a 
key fact0r influencing whether or not an object or 
situation will arouse fear is the amount of control 
which is felt in its relation. The prospect of pain, for 
instance, which according to G. Stanley Hall' "puts 
to life the question of its very survival or extinction, 
complete or partial", was reported by C.W. 
Valentine2 to have produced surprisingly little fear 
in the children he tested as long as if was roused in 
circumstances under the child's own control, in an 
expected form, and in a familiar situation. It is, of 
course, the type of control supplied by our 
knowledge and expectations about our 
surroundings (Sartre's "hodological map" or the 
mental construction of reality created in the course 
of an individual's numerous experiences with his 
milieu which is at the base of Piaget's assimilation-
accommodation model of the cognitive system) 
which is challenged or removed when we are faced 
with the very strange or the uncanny. For the 
human infant, as with many animals, strangeness 
elicits alarm: sudden noise, loss of support, jerky 
movements, quick changes of luminescence, and 
objects that rapidly expand or advance will cause 
an infant to show signs of distress. But what 
constitutes "strangeness" and the methods of 
coping with it will also change with the child's 
developing awareness and understanding of its 
environment. 
The evolutionary implication of this process 
and its links with human helplessness are 
instructively outlined by Bruner et a/: 
Man seems to have evolved with a unique capacity 
for helplessness that can be 'relieved' by outside 
shaping and external devices... The early 
helplessness of man ... seems to be accompanied by 
a propelling curiosity about the environment and by 
much self-competence in that environment.. .. 
Indeed the degree to which a supply of stimulation 
create; a demand for itma,y be crucial for a species 
in which morphological adaptation has become so 
supplemented by technological adaptation - a 
species that, in Weston La Barre's striking phrase ... 
survives by grace of prosthetic devices.3 
The extent to which competence and a sense 
of mastery will be achieved in a given <;:ontext is 
heavily influenced by the rhythms_a~d,~:hscords_of 
what M.E.P. Seligman calls the child s dance With 
his environment". According to Seligman4, the 
process of development move§from the neonate's 
almost complete lack of control over outcomes to 
the ability to make voluntary responses which a_re 
perceived to influence outcomes. If the child 
perceives its responses to be independent of what 
changes occur in the environment, or to have no 
influence on that environment at all, then a sense of 
hopelessness will _develop._ _The !11otiva~ional, 
cognitive and emotional de_flcits which Sehgman 
claimed to result from learnmg that outcomes are 
uncontrollable were later5 placed within an 
"attributional analysis of helplessness", which took 
more detailed account of individual differences and 
the question of when and where helplessness will 
generalize across situations and time when 
humans are involved. The emphasis here fell on 
whether an individual attributes his failures to his 
own limitations or to universal ones, and on ways in 
which the cause of failure Is · perceived and 
:nterpreted. In other words, both the nature of the 
environment and the individual's cognitive 
appraisal of it have to be taken into account in any 
attempt to chart out the stages which mark the 
development of helplessness and fear. 
Mary Warnock6 argues that the "power in the 
human mind which is at work in our everyday 
perception of the world, and... in our thoughts 
about what is absent" derives its impetus "from the 
emotions as much as from reason". This partly 
accounts for "the capacity we have ... for taking 
things as· significant, for seeing more in them than 
would meet the purely sensory eye". This capacity, 
Le. the imagination, "has two functions which go 
together: to shape by means of an inner poser, and 
to allow us to feel". Following Kant, Warnock 
underlines the implications of this approach by 
asserting that 
without the fictions of the imagination .... we would 
not perceive our famfllar world, and this 
means that we would not perceive the universal 
element in the world. We would be lost in an ocean 
of particular impressions. 
The "fictions of the imagination", then, inspired by 
emotion as much as by reason, determine to a large 
extent the manner in which we perceive our 
environment. Cultural differences, because they 
determine the range of possibilites of which an 
individual can become aware, have frequently been 
reported as influencing the ways objects and 
environment are perceived. Emotions too, it 
should ,be recalled, "are basically forms of 
cognition"7, so that what one feels in relation to_a 
particular situation is determined by the manner m 
whiCh the situation· is appraised, i.e. by whether 
one perceives it as agreeable or disagreeable, 
familiar or dangerous. 
The type of interaction taking place here is 
only inadequately suggested by terms like 
"stimulus and response". Our reaction to an image 
which disconcerts us by its uncanny newness or 
incongruity, and the manner in which that reaction 
is influenced by the way in which we have come to 
interpret our interaction with an environment, 
raise questions both about the workings of 
consciousness and about what the term "image" 
implies. In The Psychology of Imagination, Sartre 
asserts that "the image, like the sign, is a 
consciousness" and that "a consciousness does 
not have an opaque and unconscious surface by 
which it can be siezed and attached to another 
surface"s. Sartre underlines the motivational 
factors which come into operation when a sign or 
an image (a "consciousness" according to his 
definition) acts upon our cognitive appraisal (or 
another consciousness): 
Between two consciousnesses there is no cause and 
effect relationship. A consciousness is through and 
through a synthesis, completely withdrawn into 
itself: it is only at the very heart of this internal 
synthesis that it can join itself to another preceding 
or succeeding consciousness by an act of retention 
or pretention. Moreover, if one consciousness is to 
act on another, it must be retained and recreated by 
the consciousness on which it is to q.ct. Thereare no 
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passivities, but internal assimilations and 
disintegrations at the very heart of an intentional 
synthesis which is transparent to itself. One 
consciousness is not the cause of another: it 
motivates it.9 
The implications of these standpoints can be 
profitably considered through an examination of a 
type of fear which appears to presuppose a high 
order of imagination. The fear of the dark has often 
bee·n associated with the unease of separation and 
the absence of the comfort and security provided 
by loved Onf:!S. In one of his discussions of infantile 
anxiety, Freud10 argued that children "are afraid in 
the dark because in the dark they cannot see the 
person they love; and their fear is soothed if they 
can take hold of that person's hand in the dark". 
The fear of darkness is in fact most acute in 
children when they are alone and therefore without 
the direct reassurance of protection which their 
trust in, say, adults normally affords. But 
reassurance does not come exclusively from loved 
ones: a familiar environment which a child can see 
to contain no threats can also serve this purpose to 
varying degrees. Indeed, the "visual cliff" 
experiments of Gibson and Walk 11 suggest that 
infants will come to place more trust in their visual 
perception of situations and objects than in 
reassurances offered by parents. A child's fears 
and anxieties (e.g. in the dark) are often only 
soothed when he is shown that there is nothing to 
be afraid of. Further, it is of significance 
that the "fear of darkness" only manifests itself 
when the child's dependence on visual perception 
becomes marked (usually after the first year of 
life) 12 • Most of the reports on childhood fears of this 
nature stress not so much the darkness itself but 
rather the terrifying imagery with which it becomes 
peopled. It is, in other words, not simply a sense of 
isolation which being in the dark can create. The 
absence of sharp visual details and the curtailment 
of the ability to move will also give rise to a sense of 
disorientation in which familiar or recognizable 
surroundings become transformed into 
indeterminate darkness and strange shades. In a 
sense, the child cannot as yet trust surroundings to 
remain constant and unchanging when the sharp 
outlines he can recognize when the lights are on can 
no longer be clearly perceived in darkness. One 
can interpret this type of uncertainty as an 
extension of Piaget's theories about difficulties 
related to the concept of conservation in the 
Preoperational Stage of human development. The 
undefined nature of an environment shrouded in 
darkness, where substances appear to change 
their shapes (as well as hiding recesses where 
potential threats may lurk), undermines the 
possibility of feeling control over outcomes. It is a 
sense of helpless vulnerability and a consequent 
state of anxiety which are most likely to prevail 
under these conditions. In this context, the 
slenderest perceptual cues are interpreted in terms 
of variously disturbing images encountered in 
other contexts. The images associated with the 
ambiguous shades need not be intrinsically 
threatening. C.W. Valentine, for instance, 
reported how a five-year old girl was terrified for 
several weeks because she saw cabbages all 
around her bedroom and a girl going out of the 
window13 • 
Adults too, in their endeavours to control and 
frequently to protect the young, will often warn 
against various imaginary or threateningly decked 
figures who will punish misbehaviour, or against, in 
the old cliche, sweet-proferring strangers whose 
friendly appearance is not to be trusted. The 
"dance" of perceptual and cognitive development 
of necessity brings the child into contact with 
objects, figures and situations which cannot (and 
often should not) be readily accommodated into a 
mental picture of secure reality. Nor is the "data" 
on which the child has to work of an unambiguous 
nature. When the reassurance afforded by clearly 
perceived outlines is thus undermined, as much as 
when the trusted presence of a protecting adult is 
not readily available, it is not surprising that 
disquieting associations will be perceived as 
forming a logical part of undefined surroundings. 
This will be especially the case when darkness 
accentuates the ambiguity of surroundings. 
According to J.L. Singer, 
For the very young child the monsters of the movies 
and television are embodiments of those distortions 
and ambiguities that people the shadow world at 
night when the child is preparing for bed. Linked by 
adults to bogeymen and other threatening figures, 
these monsters cannot be readily understood or 
grasped and therefore arouse negative emotion and 
terror. 14 
It bears repeating that the shapes. taken by the 
"fictions of the imagination" in moments of 
uncertainty are strongly influenced by the cultural 
context in which we live and by the distinctions 
which we learn to make between what is "real", 
what is possible, and what is "unreal". According to 
Piage't's model of cognitive development, the 
cognitive system changes its internal structure by 
repeatedly attempting to accommodate and 
assimilate novel, previously unassimilated 
environmental elements. Because the environment 
is anything but clear-cut and the individual's 
contact with 'it is so often influenced and mediated 
by other agents (parents, peers and, supremely as 
the name suggests, the Media), the process of 
interaction can often be erratic. Thus, objects and 
situations which in reality present a substantial 
threat can be assimilated into a system which 
codes them as harmless since they can be 
associated with familiar and "safe" elements. The 
process of accommodation can also work on false 
premises when a mental picture of reality is 
restructured in such a way as to accommodate 
elements whose threat is unreal but which have 
been decked in a way which associates them with 
danger and distress. This of course is one of the 
ways in which "irrational preconceptions" and 
superstitious convictions can become part of a 
mental picture of reality (temporary or permanent 
as that picture will turn out to be depending on the 
types of further interactions which take place). 
Reflections on childhood fears inevitably raise 
questions about the cultural and social context in 
which children grow. I have argued that it is a sense 
of helplessness in the face of the very strange which 
underscores most childhood fears, and that 
disturbing ambiguities are interpreted in terms of 
the fictions of the imagination inspired by the 
multiple rhythms of interaction with an 
environment. A child's understanding of what can 
be referred to as real and of what possibilities can 
be applied to the appraisal of a particular situation 
is of necessity dependent on his culture's 
interpretation of reality and on its awareness of the 
viability or otherwise of the significance it ascribes 
· to Its surroundings. If this is the case, then a study 
of fear aspiring to any cohesiveness will have to 
attempt an account of a specific cultural situation in 
a specific moment in history. Our age is one in 
which myths are resorted to in a dangerously 
insecure and often sceptical manner, so that a 
variety of symbols and modes of perceiving remain 
enmeshed in our attempts to appraise and evaluate 
our true bearings long after they have lost any 
direct relevance. The types of fear which are likely 
to fester in this context will have origins and 
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implications which cannot be properly understood 
or resolved if our awareness of competence or 
control in relation to our environment is no more 
than an exercise in self-deception, or if our lives are 
structured around a resigned sense of helplessness 
and ruled by the politics of bitter vacuousness. 
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